Introduction
Lack of information is a serious constraint to targeting social programs effectively, especially in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) (Besley, 1993; Ravallion, 1993) .
Targeting social programs involves making distinctions between "deserving" (poor) and "undeserving" (non-poor) applicants. But this is no simple matter in countries where household characteristics such as income are rarely known. In such circumstances, policy-makers intent on targeting are forced to choose among imperfect solutions. They can rely on observable household characteristics, such as land ownership, the ratio of working age-adults to dependents, or ownership of durable goods that seem likely to separate poor from non-poor households. They can "self-target" programs by designing them so that they appeal mainly to the poor--perhaps by offering employment at belowmarket wages, or subsidizing foodstuffs consumed primarily by the poor. Or they can use "geographic targeting" to direct resources to areas in which, on average, poverty appears to be greatest (Akerlof, 1978; Besley and Kanbur, 1990; Grosh, 1992) .
Geographic targeting is appealing because it is comparatively simple to administer.
Different parts of a country--regions, provinces, districts, even city blocks--are ranked by some measure of deprivation. This measure could be income-based poverty or, more commonly, an indicator of health, educational or nutritional status, or access to basic services, such as electricity or running water. Resources are then allocated in inverse proportion to average welfare, so that poor regions receive higher per capita transfers than rich ones. Alternatively, rich areas can be excluded from the program altogether.
The simplicity of geographic targeting is an important advantage when lack of information or administrative capacity is a serious concern. This paper discusses geographic targeting in Peru. Specifically, I compare a number of geographic targeting indicators that have been considered by policy-makers in the Ministry of the Presidency. These include the infant mortality rate; a composite "poverty" index developed by the Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES); and an estimate of "imputed" poverty which combines census and survey data in an attempt to approximate money-based measures of welfare. In 1995, the Ministry of the Presidency, the single largest implementing agency of social and economic infrastructure programs in Peru, spent about 2.2 billion soles--1 billion U.S. $--on small-scale infrastructure and service-delivery projects which could conceivably be targeted. The results show that targeting outcomes are quite similar for a number of targeting indicators. The one exception is the targeting mechanism currently favored by the Ministry of the Presidency, which performs far worse than any of the alternatives. The simulations show that the poor are likely to benefit more from an equal transfer to all Peruvians, poor and non-poor alike, than they do from this "targeted" regime.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes alternative geographic targeting indicators available in Peru. Section 3 describes the methodology I use to compare indicators. It also describes alternative performance measures, identifies formulas that can be used to allocate resources to districts, describes data requirements, and states the assumptions made for the simulation exercise. Section 4 summarizes the results of the analysis. Section 5 draws conclusions.
Geographic targeting indicators in Peru
In 1997 there were 13 administrative regions, 24 departments, 194 provinces, and 1812 districts in Peru (Webb and Fernández Baca, 1997, p. 112) . Recent discussion about the geographic targeting of government programs has focused on the use of district-level averages. Districts can be quite small in Peru: According to the 1993 Population and Housing Census, the average district population was about 12,600
inhabitants, but some, predominantly rural districts had less than 200 inhabitants.
Infant mortality
The infant mortality rate measures the fraction of children ever born who do not reach the first year of age. In Peru, as in many other developing countries, one would be loathe to estimate infant mortality on the basis of seriously incomplete death registries.
To address this problem, demographers have developed indirect methods to estimate (PRONAA), social services (INABIF), and numerous multi-sectoral programs (FONCODES, COOPOP, mortality at early ages (Hill, Zlotnik and Trussell, 1983; Brass and Macrae, 1984 and 1985; Trussell and Menken, 1984 of residence on which information had been gathered in the 1993 census. In the second stage, the coefficients from these departmental regressions were applied to district-level data from the 1993 census to estimate district-level infant mortality rates (INEI, 1997) .
The FONCODES index
Peru has a long history of developing "poverty maps" based on composite indices of unmet basic needs. The first of these maps was constructed by Webb with information from the 1961 population census (Webb, 1977) . This poverty map was updated with new censuses conducted in 1972 , 1981 , and 1993 Banco Central de Reserva, 1981; INEI, 1994) . FONCODES, in turn, has developed composite poverty INADE) (World Bank, 1996) . maps since its creation in 1991, often with technical assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the German development agency GTZ.
The current district-level poverty map was developed by FONCODES and the Ministry of the Presidency. It is based on eight indicators--the rate of chronic malnutrition, illiteracy, school-aged children not in school, overcrowded housing, inadequate roofing, and the proportion of the population without access to water, sewerage, and electricity. All of these indicators except the rate of chronic malnutrition were estimated with data from the 1993 population census. The rate of chronic malnutrition was estimated from a census of height and weight amongst school-aged children, also conducted in 1993 (FONCODES, 1995 and 1996) . (INEI, 1996) .
This procedure is conceptually similar to that used to estimate infant mortality at the district level. INEI estimated income in 1995 on the basis of the household survey, and then regressed income in every department on its correlates--household composition, education levels, access to basic services such as water, sewerage and electricity, ownership of durable goods, such as television, radio and refrigerator, and other variables included in both the census and the survey. The coefficients from the 24 departmentlevel regressions were then used to impute average income in every district, and the fraction of the population in each district below an income-based poverty line.
The analytic framework
This section describes the analytic framework I use for the empirical comparisons of geographic targeting indicators.
Measures of performance
The simplest measure of targeting focuses on leakage and undercoverage rates (Grosh, pp. 16-17; Baker and Grosh, 1994) . A poverty line is chosen to separate "poor" from "non-poor". Leakage rates are then defined as the fraction of total program resources which go to the non-poor, and undercoverage rates as the fraction of the poor who do not benefit from the program. (Chaudhuri and Ravallion, 1994) . This is an exercise in comparative statics: what is total poverty before and immediately after the transfer? By this measure, the preferred geographic targeting indicator directs limited resources to areas where they would have the greatest short-term impact on poverty. More complex formulations, which might model the expected long-term returns from transfers to different districts, are beyond the scope of this paper (see the comments by Binswanger, 1989 , cited in Ravallion, 1993 .
In what follows I use three poverty measures from the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) family--the headcount index, the poverty gap, and the P 2 measure (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984) . The FGT family of poverty measures follows the general formulation below:
where y is income, z the poverty line, and α is a parameter which represents the aversion to inequality. When α=0, P 0 corresponds to the headcount index--the number of people below the poverty line; when α=1, P 1 corresponds to the poverty gap--a sum of the individual shortfalls in income for those below the poverty line, as a fraction of the poverty line itself. As α increases, the measure gives a greater weight to the poorest poor, and at very high values of α P α approaches a "Rawlsian" measure of welfare which gives weight only to the poorest household. The P 2 measure corresponds to a value of α=2.
Finally, one could look at changes in the entire distribution of log PCE, rather than just at changes for those below the poverty line. I use non-parametric (kernel) density estimates for this purpose.
Allocation formulas
When there is no targeting, districts are simply allocated resources according to their share of the total population in the country, and everyone is assumed to receive the same per capita transfer. This no-targeting scenario serves as a benchmark to measure additional reductions in poverty that could be achieved when geographic targeting is conducted on the basis of some welfare indicator. The "FONCODES method" thus makes all districts in the country eligible for benefits, but weights the population of each one by its poverty index. For example, Coronel Castañeda, the district with the highest value of the FONCODES index (36.38), and a population of 607 inhabitants, would be allocated (36.38*607)/346,201,217 = .0064% of the total budget for that year. By contrast, Pacocha, the district with the lowest value of the FONCODES index (1.00), and a population of 6500, would be allocated (1*6,500)/346,201,217 = .0019% of the total budget for that year. Per capita allocations to inhabitants of Coronel Castañeda Castañeda would therefore be almost 37 times per capita allocations to inhabitants of Pacocha.
5 Note that if the index is a poverty rate, allocations to district i simply correspond to the fraction of the poor who live in district i.
I adapt the "FONCODES method" to other indicators by substituting the infant mortality rates and the imputed poverty measure for the FONCODES index in equation (2) population. I consider an allocation formula which assigns funds only to the prioritized districts and makes uniform per capita transfers to all residents of these eligible districts.
The simulations in this paper make a number of assumptions. The most important assumption is that there is no targeting of program resources within a given district. Figure 1 shows kernel (lowess) regressions of the probability of benefiting from social programs on the rank of a household within a district, when households within a district is then the sum of the rural and urban allocations--standardized to add up to 100%. Ad hoc adjustments are also made to privilege border areas, to coordinate investments with other public sector programs, and to ensure that each of FONCODES' regional offices (which correspond roughly to individual departments) has a minimum operating budget. I do not take these "refinements" into account in the simulations below.
are ordered by the log of per capita income. 6 The programs considered are the two largest food distribution programs (FONCODES and PRONAA) and the two largest education infrastructure programs (INFES and FONCODES) in the Ministry of the Presidency. Note that because households within a district are ranked by the log of per capita income, the regressions control for the mean income of a district. Data for these regressions comes from a household survey conducted by INEI in 1996, covering 17,216 households throughout the country; over 75% of the households sampled lived in districts in which 25 or more households were interviewed.
The lines in Figure 1 are reasonably flat, suggesting that the assumption of zero intra-district targeting is not unreasonable. 7 This suggests two logical ways of distributing simulated program benefits within a district. First, one could assume that every person in a district receives the same per capita transfer. Second, one could randomly select a sample of beneficiaries in a district, with a constant probability of selection approximated by the empirical probabilities estimated in Figure 1 . In either case, the expected value of the transfer to each individual is given by:
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where π ij is the probability that an individual will receive a transfer, and the subscripts i and j refer to people and districts, respectively. πij=1 if everyone in a district is assumed to receive a transfer, while πij is a number between 0 and 1 if only a fraction of residents in a given district benefit from transfers. As a matter of computational convenience, I distribute transfers evenly amongst all residents in a district.
The simulations assume that benefits from program investments in a district accrue entirely to the residents of that district. This might not hold, say, if beneficiaries of a food distribution program implemented in one district are residents of a different district.
But intra-district spill-overs are unlikely to be systematic--that is, they should not consistently favor residents of one kind of district over residents of another. Intra-district spill-overs should therefore not affect the rank order of indicators either.
Some additional assumptions have to be made about the impact of transfers on various poverty measures. Poverty in Peru has generally been defined as an individual's inability to meet a specified level of expenditures--the poverty line.
8 Individual expenditures--approximated by total household expenditures divided by the number of eligible household members--is the relevant metric to measure changes in poverty. We must therefore translate expenditures by social programs into household expenditures--by first translating program expenditures into changes in household income, and then estimating the proportion of additional disposable income that is spent. As a matter of convenience, I have assumed that all program expenditures translate into additional household income and that all of this additional income is spent.
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The simulations assume that the cost of administering programs is constant across regions. This is an important assumption, since the cost of building infrastructure may differ systematically between urban and rural areas. I check how robust the results are to this assumption by reporting the level of urban-rural cost differences that would be necessary to change the rank-order of indicators.
Finally, I ignore the effects of transfers on behavior such as migration towards districts which receive large per capita transfers, offsetting reductions in private intrahousehold transfers or employment, and the impact of taxes needed to finance poverty alleviation programs.
The data set
For all of the estimations below, I combine information from two sources: districtlevel averages of the infant mortality rate, the FONCODES index, and the measure of imputed poverty, and household-level data on expenditures. District-level averages are available from INEI, and household-level data can be estimated from the 1994 and 1997 LSMS, both of which were executed by the Peruvian think-tank Cuanto.
District-level data can be used to estimate the proportion of total funds that would be allocated to every district under alternative targeting regimes. Further dividing this fraction by the total population of the district in question allows us to calculate the proportion of funds that would be allocated to every individual. Finally, multiplying this under-estimate the relative performance of targeting indicators which assign a higher share of their resources to the poorest districts. One potential solution would be to estimate marginal propensities to save for households from the LSMS itself. The simplest way to do this would be to convert measures of income and expenditures into current prices, and then take the difference between them as a measure of savings (see especially Paxson, 1992) . By this measure, however, almost two-thirds (61%) of households in the 1994 LSMS dissaved. This seems unreasonable and suggests that income in these surveys is seriously underestimated vis-à-vis expenditures.
proportion by the total budget available for poverty alleviation programs, we can estimate per capita transfers.
The LSMS can be used to estimate the expenditures of the households in the sample (3,558 for 1994, and 3,840 for 1997) and, dividing total household expenditures by household size, for household members (18,362 for 1994 and 19,562 for 1997) . These estimates can be combined with information on poverty lines to calculate the headcount index, poverty gap, and P 2 measure at a national level before any transfers take place.
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The 1994 and 1997 Peru LSMS drew households from 364 and 397 clusters, respectively, and the accompanying literature lists the districts from which each one of these clusters was drawn. Observations in the LSMS can be coded manually with district identifiers which match those used by INEI, and district-level and household-level data can then be merged. Having done this, we keep only those observations for which there are matching codes for place of residence in both data sets--in effect, discarding the district-level information for all but the 199 and 238 districts which were sampled in the 1994 and 1997 LSMS, respectively. 11 The new, composite data set is representative in 10 Note that regional price deflators available from Cuanto and INEI are used throughout the paper to deflate both household expenditures and simulated transfers. 11 In theory, the first step in the FGT approach implemented in the simulations in this paper would divide a given budget amongst the 1812 districts in Peru. How much gets allocated to each district would then depend on the targeting indicator and the allocation formula in question (see pp. 8-10 above). But the fact that households in the 1994 and 1997 LSMS were only drawn from 199 and 238 districts across the country, respectively, raises a potential problem: since every targeting indicator allocates a different amount to each district, the total budget for this sample of districts would not be constant across indicators. For example, the proportion of the total budget allocated to the 199 districts in the 1994 LSMS would be smaller by the FONCODES index than by the measure of imputed poverty. As a result, the total amount transferred to the 3,558 households in the survey would be smaller when we use the FONCODES index than when we use the imputed poverty measure, even after each household in the survey is weighted by its expansion factor. At the heart of the problem is the fact that the LSMS draws a nationally-representative sample of households irrespective of the district in which these households live. If a number of samples were drawn, on average, the total budget would be the same across indicators-but this does not hold for any one sample. I have corrected for this problem by normalizing the budget-in effect, summing equation (2) above only over the sample of districts in the LSMS. Note that this is not an issue with the concentration curve approach because concentration curves graph out the proportion of a given budget that is allocated to each household in the survey-weighted, once again, by the appropriate expansion factors. Because concentration curves are mean-normalized in this way, the results are budget-independent.
exactly the same way as the original LSMS data set, and can be used to make accurate calculations about changes in expenditures and poverty at the national level.
Results
This section summarizes the study's empirical findings. As a first step, I present estimates of poverty and allocations of funds by region. I then estimate leakage and undercoverage rates under alternative targeting scenarios. Next, I present concentration curves. I graph the expected changes in the headcount index, poverty gap and P 2 measure at different budget levels, and estimate the cost of achieving a given reduction in poverty under alternative targeting regimes. Finally, I display non-parametric (kernel) estimates of the distribution of the log of per capita expenditures after transfers have been made on the basis of different targeting indicators.
Distribution of poverty and allocated expenditures by region
About two-thirds of the population of Peru lives in urban areas, and well over a third of these urban residents live in the capital city, Lima. just over one-third of the population lives in rural areas, but between 44% and 55% of poverty was found there in 1994, and as much as 47% to 57% in 1997.
The most notable result in Table 1 is the extent to which the PROFINES Plan favors urban areas: it assigns about 80% of resources to Lima and other urban areas, even though less than 55% of poverty in Peru is found there. The explanation for this finding is simple: many districts which were prioritized in the PROFINES Plan because they had the highest value of the product of the FONCODES index and population are simply those districts with the largest population. Not surprisingly, these districts are primarily urban. The most notable result in Table 2 once again refers to the PROFINES Plan. The leakage rate when there is no targeting (46.50 in 1994, and 51.15 in 1997) corresponds exactly to the fraction of the population which is not in poverty. The leakage rate when geographic targeting is based on the PROFINES Plan (47.26 in 1994, and 53.06 in 1997) is actually higher than the corresponding leakage rate when there is no targeting. 13 Many of the prioritized districts in the PROFINES Plan appear to have a higher-than-average fraction of non-poor households.
Leakage and undercoverage rates
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Concentration curves
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 display concentration curves for the no targeting scenario, the PROFINES Plan, the FONCODES index, the infant mortality rate and the imputed poverty indicator for 1994 and 1997, respectively. The line for the no targeting scenario is a straight, forty-five degree line: every individual receives the same transfer, so the cumulative fraction of the transfer equals the cumulative fraction of the population at every point. In both 1994 and 1997, the concentration curves for the FONCODES index, the infant mortality rate, and the measure of imputed poverty lie well above this line: no 12 Note that the estimated undercoverage rates are (obviously) very sensitive to the assumption of a uniform distribution of transfers to all residents in a district. 13 Bootstrapping the differences between leakage rates by various indicators suggests that the differences between, on the one hand, the FONCODES index, the infant mortality rate, and the imputed poverty rate and, on the other hand, the PROFINES Plan or the no targeting baseline scenario are significant at the 1% level or better. In general, other differences in leakage rates are not significant (estimates available from the author upon request). 14 By the 1994 LSMS, for example, the headcount index among households in districts included in the PROFINES Plan is 52.7%, while the headcount index for households in other districts is 55.1% The corresponding figures from the 1997 LSMS are 46.9% for districts in the PROFINES Plan, and 51.7% for other districts.
matter where we take the cut-off between "poor" and "non-poor" to be, We can therefore say that this curve first-order stochastically dominates the alternatives. Figures 5.1, 5.2, 6.1 and 6.2 show that the impact on the poverty gap and the P 2 measure tends to be largest when targeting is conducted on the basis of the infant mortality rate, at least for budgets below 3.5 billion soles. But the differences between outcomes by the infant mortality rate, FONCODES index, and imputed poverty are very small indeed.
All of the graphs suggest that the PROFINES targeting scheme performs substantially worse than targeting by any alternative. Comparing targeting by the PROFINES Plan and the infant mortality rate in 1994 at the reference budget of 2.2 billion soles, for example, we see that the headcount index could be brought down to 45.66, rather than 46.99; the poverty gap to 13.23, rather than 14.68; and the P 2 measure to 5.25, rather than 6.37. In 1997, the corresponding figures are 43.40, rather than 44.32 for the headcount index; 11.79, rather than 13.02 for the poverty gap; and 4.41, rather than 5.30 for the P 2 measure.
PROFINES regime to no targeting at all. The "targeted" PROFINES regime seems like a bad investment indeed.
Unit costs: In allocating transfers for the construction of infrastructure, policymakers often argue that unit costs are higher in rural than in urban areas-presumably because (likely) higher transportation costs are not fully offset by (likely) lower wage costs. As I discuss above, the PROFINES Plan allocates most resources to urban areas.
To test the robustness of my results to the assumption of constant unit costs, I estimate the ratio of rural-to-urban costs that would be necessary for the PROFINES Plan to outperform the infant mortality rate in terms of the estimated impact on poverty. measure, the cost ratio would have to be below .25: that is, it would have to be four to five times as expensive to build infrastructure in rural areas for transfers by the PROFINES Plan to have the same impact on the P 2 measure as transfers by the infant mortality rate. If there are indeed differences in unit costs in Peru, they are unlikely to be of this order of magnitude. present density estimates for only two indicators-the infant mortality rate and the PROFINES Plan (for similar graphs, see Case and Deaton, 1998) . A vertical line which corresponds to the log of PCE at the poverty line is also included. Both graphs show that the left tail of the distribution for the PROFINES Plan has more mass than the corresponding distribution for the infant mortality rate: that is, the fraction of people with very low levels of income would be higher had transfers been based on the PROFINES regime than on the infant mortality rate. By contrast, more mass is concentrated around the middle of the distribution when transfers are made using the infant mortality rate (the difference is particularly clear in Figure 8 .2, which corresponds to 1997). Figures 9.1 and 9.2 present the corresponding cumulative density functions. The results show that in both cases the infant mortality density function first-order stochastically dominates the corresponding PROFINES density function. No matter where the poverty line is set, and no matter which poverty measure from the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke family is chosen, poverty will be lower when transfers are based on the infant mortality rate than when they are based on the PROFINES regime.
Non-parametric density estimates
Conclusion
This paper evaluates alternative indicators for geographic targeting available at the district level in Peru. The analysis contributes to the comparative literature on targeting methods (Besley and Kanbur; Datt and Ravallion; Grosh; Ravallion, 1992 and 1993; Baker and Grosh; Chaudhuri and Ravallion; Ravallion and Sen, 1994) . indicator which consistently performs much worse than all of the others is the PROFINES Plan: it has high leakage rates, it reduces poverty by a smaller amount, and the incidence of benefits is regressive. In general, the PROFINES Plan serves the poor less well than a uniform transfer to poor and non-poor alike. 
